Cooperation: strategy for sustainability of resources

Clemencia Martínez Aldana



This article seeks to answer the question: ¿what should be the principle of structuring an organization if there is no basis underlying the foundation of the structure dedicated to the sustainability of resources? The proposed idea is not only to define the corporate structure, but also seek mutual benefits collectively, to facilitate sustainability and optimization of resources of the organization, from coherent, relevant, viable and rigorous strategies. To this end the postulates of critics Robert Axelrod, Michael Taylor, Thomas Schelling, Roy Behr, Elinor Ostrom and Garret Hardin, which formed the basis for the theoretical formulation of evolution in cooperation systems related resources are presented. Presents and analyzes the principles of: definition of limits, rules and sanctions for resource appropriators, collective choice arrangements, and supervision. Product of the approaches set, it follows that to obtain significant benefits, it is necessary to develop models of collective self-management and self-management.


cooperation, social choice. corporate culture, groups, social capital

Full Text:

PDF (Sp)


Ashworth, T. (1980). Trench Warfare. (1914-1918): The Live and Let Live System, New York: Holmes & Meier.

Axelrod, R. (1980a). Effective Choice in the Prisone´s Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24, 3-25.

Axelrod, R. (1980b). More Effective Choice in the Prisone´s Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24, 379-403.

Axelrod, R. (1981). The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoist. American Political Science Review, 75, 306-318.

Axelrod, R. (1986). La evolución de la Cooperación – El dilema del prisionero y la teoría de juegos. Madrid: Alianza editores.

Behr, R. L. (1981). Nice Guys Finish last–Sometimes. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25, 289-300.

Bullock K & Baden, J. (1977). Communes and the Logic of the Commons. En: G. Hardin & J. Baden (eds.), Managing the Commons, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.

Chase, I. (1980). Cooperative and Noncooperative Behavior in Animal. American Naturalist, 115, 827-857

Dawes, R. (1980). Social Dilemma. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169-193

Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Downing, L. (1975). The Prisoner`s Dilemma Game as a Problem-Solving Phenomenon: An Outcome Maximizing Interpretation. Simulation and Games 6, 366-391.

Fagen, R. (1980). When Doves Conspire: Evolution of Nondamaging Fighting Tactics in a Nonrandom-Encounter Animal Conflict Model. American Naturalist, 115, 858-869

Fisher, R. A. (1958). The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Freeman, W. (1964). Population, Evolution, and Birth Control. San Francisco: Garret Hardin eds.

Haldane, J.B.S. (1955). Population Genetics. New Biology, 19, 34-51

Hamilton, W. D. (1963). The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior. American Naturalist, 97, 354-356.

Hardin, G. (1968). La Tragedia de los Comunes. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248. Traducción de Horacio Bonfil Sánchez. Gaceta Ecológica, num.37, Instituto Nacional de Ecología, México, 1995.

Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248.

Howard, N. (1966). The Mathematics of Meta-Games. General Systems, 11 (5): 187-200.

Howard, N. (1971). Paradoxes of Racionality: Theory of Metagames and Political Behavior, Cambridge: Mass MIT Press.

Lack, D. (1954). The Natural Regulation of Animal Numbers. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lumsden, M. (1973). The Cyprus Conflict as a Prisioner´s Dilemma, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17, 7-32.

Neher, P.A. (1978). The Pure Theory of the Muggery, American Economic Review, 68, 437-445.

Norman, C. (1984). No Panacea for the Firewood Crisis. Science, 226(4675), 676.

Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Oskamp, S. (1971). Effects of Programmed Strategies on Cooperation in the Prisoner`s Dilemma and Other Mixed-Motive Games. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15; 225-229.

Ostrom, E. (2000). El Gobierno de los Bienes Comunes. La evolución de las instituciones de acción colectiva. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Ostrom, E. Gardne, R., & Walker, J. (1994). Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Ostrom, V. (1991). The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Goerning Society. San Francisco: ICS Press.

Ostrom, V.; Feeny, D.; & Picht, H. (1993). Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives, and Choices. San Francisco: ICS Press.

Picardi, A. C. & Seifert, W. (1977). A Tragedy of the commons in the Sahel. Ekistics, 43; 297-304.

Plott, C. & Meyer R. (1975). The Technology of Public Goods, Externalities, and the Exclusion Principle. En: E.S. Mills (ed), Economic, Analysis of Enviroinmental Problems. Ney York: Columbia University Press.

Rapoport, A, (1967). Escape from Paradox. Scientific American 217, 50-56

Rapoport, A. & Chammah, A. (1965). Prisoner´s Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Scharpf, F.W. (1985). Ideological Conflict the Public-Private Frontier: Some Exploratory Notes, Berlín: Wissenschftszentrum, Documento de trabajo.

Scharpf, F.W. (1987). A Game-Theoretical Explanation of Inflation and Unemployment in Western Europe, Journal of Public Policy, 7, 227-258.

Scharpf, F.W. (1988). The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration, Public Administration, 66, 239-278.

Schelling, T. C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schelling, T. C. (1973). Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A Study of Binary Choices with Externalities. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17, 381-428.

Schelling, T. C. (1978). Micromotives and Macrobehavior. En: Thomas Schelling, ed., Micromotives and Macrobehavior, 9-43. New York: Norton.

Shepsle, K. & Weingast, B. (1984). Legislative Politics and Budget Outcomes. En: G. Mills y J. Palmer (eds.), Federal Budget Policy in the 1980´s. Washington: Urban Institute Press, 343-367.

Shubik, M. (1970). Game Theory, behavior, and the Paradox of Prisoner`s Dilemma: Three Solutions. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14, 181-194.

Smith M. (1974). The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflict. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 47, 209-221.

Smith, M. (1978). The Evolution of Behavior. Scientific American, 239, 176-192.

Snidal, D. (1985). Coordination Versus Prisioner´s Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimens, American Political Science Review, 79, 923-947.

Taylor, M. (1976). Anarchy and Cooperation. New York: Wiley.

Taylor, M. (1987). The possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomson, J.T. (1977). Ecological Deterioration: Local-Level Rule Making and Enforcement Problems in Niger. En: M.H.Glantz (ed), Desertification: Environmental Degradation in and around Arid Lands. Boulder: Westview Press, 57-79.

Trivers, R. (1971). The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35-57.

Von Neuman, J. & Morgenstern, O. (2007). Theory of Games the Economic Bahavior. Pricenton: Princeton University Press.

Wilson, R. (1985). Contraints on Social Dilemmas: An Institutional Approach, Annal of Operations Reserch, 2, 183-200.

Wilson, W. (1971). Reciprocation and Other Techniques for Inducing Cooperation in the Dilemma Game. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15, 167-195.


  • There are currently no refbacks.

Copyright (c) 2016 Clemencia Martínez Aldana

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.